An Argument for Requiring Officer Identification
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INTRODUCTION

Imagine this scenario: A man exits his workplace in a bad neighborhood and enters his car. He turns to his left and sees several men
running toward him with guns drawn. Panicking, he reaches for his
own weapon to defend himself, only to be shot through the neck.
When the strangers reach his car, they inform him that they are undercover police officers executing an arrest warrant. Because of his
injuries, he is paralyzed below the neck.
Most law-abiding citizens would wonder, quite reasonably, why
the officers did not identify themselves. Indeed, in the case on which
this fact pattern was based, the victim asked this question of the police
when they arrived at his vehicle.' When confronted with a situation
like the one outlined above, most would agree that they would act
quite differently if they knew that they were being confronted by police officers rather than criminals. This Comment addresses whether
an arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the officers fail to identify themselves as police when conducting the arrest.
In Wilson v Arkansas,' the Supreme Court held that Fourth
Amendment reasonableness depends in part on whether officers knock
and announce their presence prior to entering a home to conduct a
search.! The rationale behind this rule was articulated in Hudson v
Michigan,4 where the majority explained that the "knock-andannounce" rule protected three vital interests: life and limb, property,
and privacy.! Recently, several plaintiffs, pointing to the Court's holding
in Wilson, have argued that the logic of the knock-and-announce rule
ought to be extended to police officers conducting arrests in public.
This Comment defends the constitutional validity of a rule requiring police officers to identify themselves as police when conducting an arrest. Specifically, this Comment argues that when an officer
t
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fails to identify himself, all three of the interests that the knock-andannounce rule protects are implicated, and thus the police should be
required to identify themselves prior to conducting arrests in public.
Part I provides a brief legal history of the Fourth Amendment, examines 42 USC § 1983 claims and the doctrine of qualified immunity,
and introduces the knock-and-announce rule. Part II details how
courts have dealt with the argument that Wilson should be extended
to the failure-to-identify context. Finally, Part III argues that courts
should adopt a rule requiring officers to identify themselves unless
they possess reasonable suspicion that doing so would be dangerous.
Although adopting an identification requirement could overly burden
police officers and endanger their lives, a fair reading of Wilson's
progeny obviates this concern by allowing officers to suspend a rule
requiring identification in instances where they possess reasonable
suspicion that identification would threaten their safety.
This Comment's proposed rule-which targets the unreasonable
manner in which seizures are carried out, rather than the process by
which authorization for these seizures is obtained-would adequately
compensate injured plaintiffs through the tort system while shifting
the costs of injuries arising from failures to identify from individual
plaintiffs to society as a whole. This would not only give police officers
an additional incentive to use the least dangerous means of arresting
suspects, but it would also avoid placing citizens in situations where
they are confronted by unknown assailants. This Comment's proposed
rule would help guide both police and citizen behavior.
I. SECTION 1983 AND THE KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE RULE
Before discussing cases in which an officer fails to identify him-

self or this Comment's argument that the Fourth Amendment requires him to do so, it is necessary to summarize briefly the applicable
Fourth Amendment case law in this area. Part L.A explains the legal
rules allowing civil suits under 42 USC § 1983 for violations of constitutional rights as well as the doctrine of qualified immunity. Part I.B
introduces the knock-and-announce rule.
A. Section 1983 and Qualified Immunity
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures.! In determining whether a given search or
seizure is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the Court has
6
US Const Amend IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."). See
United States v Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 US 259,265 (1990).
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recognized that there is no fixed test and that reasonableness is left
for trial courts to examine on a case-by-case basis. Generally speaking, when an individual's Fourth Amendment rights are violated,
there are two avenues for relief: the exclusionary rule and tort relief
under § 1983. By providing a right of action for an underlying constitutional tort committed by state actors, § 1983 compensates citizens
via the civil tort system. This means that plaintiffs must allege a violation of a specific constitutional right (such as a violation of the right to
be free from unreasonable seizures) in order to successfully bring a
§ 1983 suit. In the context of Fourth Amendment seizures, there are
two basic violations: lack of proper constitutional authorization for a
seizure,' and failure to conduct the seizure reasonably."o This Comment deals with the second violation.
It is important to note that not all such violations are compensable. That is, when an action is brought against officers or agents of the
government acting in their official capacity, officials may escape liability through the doctrine of qualified immunity. This doctrine allows
courts to balance the need to provide recovery to plaintiffs against the
danger that unlimited liability will deter public officials from taking
necessary action for fear that litigation will be brought against them."
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense allowing an officer to
dismiss the case at the pleading stage, thereby sparing him from the
time and expense of litigation. 2 In Anderson v Creighton," the Court
held that whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity in a
Fourth Amendment case turns on the objective reasonableness of his
action." The question is whether a reasonable officer would have believed that his actions were lawful in light of clearly established law

7
See Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643, 653 (1961). For example, it may be reasonable for police
to wait less time before entering a residence if the sought-after material is cocaine than if it is a
missing grand piano. See United States v Banks, 540 US 31, 41-42 (2003).
8 The exclusionary rule allows defendants to exclude evidence obtained through a Fourth
Amendment violation. See Weeks v United States, 232 US 383,398 (1914). See also Mapp, 367 US
at 655 (extending the exclusionary rule to the states). Recently, the Court has cut back on the
application of the exclusionary rule. See Herring v United States, 129 S Ct 695, 700-01 (2009)
(suggesting that the exclusionary rule should not be applied as a default and should be applied
only where the deterrence benefits outweigh the costs).
9 See Nathanson v United States, 290 US 41, 47 (1933); Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 21 (1968).
10 See Camara v Municipal Court,387 US 523,534-39 (1967).
11 See Anderson v Creighton,483 US 635,638 (1987) (describing qualified immunity as the
result of balancing plaintiff and government interests). See also Harlow v Fitzgerald,457 US 800,
814 (1982) (noting that without the balancing test, the deterrent effect on public officials would
harm society).
12 See Harlow,457 US at 815.
13 483 US 635 (1987).
14 Id at 639.
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and the information that he possessed." Subjective beliefs are irrelevant, and the contours of the constitutional right allegedly violated
must be clearly established." This doctrine allows officials to anticipate when their conduct will give rise to liability for damages." Thus,
qualified immunity operates as a safeguard against unlimited tort liability for public officials, ensuring that liability attaches only for gross
violations of a plaintiffs clearly established constitutional rights.
Courts were once required to articulate whether a constitutional
right had been violated before considering whether the law was clearly
established at the time of the violation." But in Pearson v Callahan,"
the Court reasoned that while a rigid order of consideration may be
preferable in many cases, overcrowded dockets made this inflexible
rule impracticable." As a result, district courts have discretion over
the order in which they apply the test.21 This creates a catch-22 where
courts sometimes use qualified immunity as a device for clearing
overcrowded dockets but do not clarify the law to give police officers
or citizens fair notice of what the law requires.
Indeed, the threshold for defeating a claim of qualified immunity
is very high in the circuit courts. The First Circuit, for example, requires that the cases that have already been decided be factually indistinguishable "in a fair way from the [case] at hand" in order to defeat
a claim of qualified immunity." Likewise, the Seventh Circuit requires
that plaintiffs find a violation of the right they claim in factually similar cases in order to defeat qualified immunity." The impact on qualified immunity cases is clear: until a critical mass of factually similar
cases develops, courts are likely to find that the law was not clearly

Id at 641.
at 640-41.
17 Anderson, 483 US at 646 (suggesting that the alternative rule would require officers to
"entangle[] themselves in English and American common law" if they wanted certainty that they
would not be subject to suit).
18 See Saucier v Katz, 533 US 194,201 (2001).
15

16 Id

19 129 S Ct 808 (2009).

Id at 818.
Id at 821.
22 See Savard v Rhode Island, 338 F3d 23, 32-34 (1st Cir 2003) (allowing a qualified immunity defense and noting that when judges can disagree across a spectrum of similar cases
involving strip searches, defendants cannot reasonably be expected to anticipate that their conduct will give rise to Fourth Amendment liability).
23 Borello v Allison, 446 F3d 742, 749-50 (7th Cir 2006) (permitting a qualified immunity
defense where the plaintiff did not point to any factually similar cases demonstrating that when a
prison official ignores a request for a cell transfer, this conduct violates the Eighth Amendment).
See also id at 750 (noting that qualified immunity will also be defeated where "the violation was so
clear that an official would realize [the violation] ... even in the absence of an on-point case").
20
21
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established at the time of the offense. But by allowing courts to rule
on the qualified immunity claim prior to articulating the constitutional
right at issue, the Supreme Court's holding in Pearson hinders the
development of this critical mass of cases. As a result, plaintiffs bringing these claims go uncompensated.
B.

The Knock-and-Announce Rule

The Supreme Court has long recognized the special legal status
of the home, requiring police officers to knock and announce their
presence prior to entering a home to conduct an arrest or a search.
The knock-and-announce rule deals exclusively with a failure to conduct a search properly (as opposed to a failure to obtain authorization
for that search by demonstrating adequate probable cause). This Part
explores the knock-and-announce rule and its development.
1. In most situations, police officers must knock and announce
their presence prior to entering a home.
In Wilson, the Supreme Court granted additional procedural protections to individuals against searches by the government." The defendant in Wilson made numerous sales of narcotics to a police informant and threatened him with a pistol if he turned out to be working
with the police." The police obtained a warrant to search Sharlene
Wilson's house and arrest her. In executing the warrant, the police
officers entered through an unlocked screen door, identifying themselves as police officers as they entered the home.27 In the subsequent
search they uncovered various narcotics, including marijuana, methamphetamine, and Valium, as well as a pistol and ammunition.
The Court held that the reasonableness of a search of a dwelling
depends in part on whether the officers announced their presence and
authority prior to entering the house.29 The Court found that at the
time of ratification, the common law required constables to announce
their presence prior to entering a home, relying in large part on the
24 Other circuits have embraced differing standards. See, for example, Papineau
v Parmley,
465 F3d 46,56-61 (2d Cir 2006) (stating that "the right at issue in a qualified immunity case need
not be limited to the specific factual situation in which that right was articulated"). This Part's
discussion is limited to the First and Seventh Circuits, because those courts are the ones that
have addressed officers' failure to identify. See Part II.A.
2
514 Us at 936.
26 Id at 929.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29
Wilson, 514 US at 931 (explaining that an evaluation of "reasonableness" under the Fourth
Amendment has been traditionally guided by common law rights at the time of ratification).
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theory that a "man's home is his castle." The King's sheriffs could
break into and enter a suspect's home, but only if they first announced
their presence and gave the suspect time to answer the door." The
Court reasoned that, given this longstanding common law requirement, the Framers likely would have considered a failure to knock
and announce as a factor in the reasonableness inquiry under the
Fourth Amendment." But the Court was careful to clarify that the
knock-and-announce rule should not be interpreted as a bright-line
requirement. Looking again to the common law, the Court found that
English courts did not require an announcement of an officer's presence if such an announcement was likely to aid in the suspect's escape.32 While it did not attempt to delineate factors that would obviate
the knock-and-announce requirement, the Court did note that police
officers could establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry.
2. The Court refines the knock-and-announce rule.
In Richards v Wisconsin," the Court clarified situations where the
police might defend a failure to knock and announce prior to entry. In
Richards, officers obtained a search warrant for the defendant's motel
room.3 They previously applied for a "no knock" warrant-as permitted by Wisconsin law-but the magistrate denied the application.35
Several plainclothes officers and at least one uniformed officer accompanied an officer dressed as a maintenance man to Steiney Richards's hotel room. The plainclothes officer knocked and asked if he
could enter the room.36 The defendant opened the door as far as the
chain bolt would permit, but then saw a police officer in uniform behind the plainclothes officers and slammed the door. The police
kicked the door down and found Richards trying to escape through an
open window. A search of the room yielded cash and cocaine.37
At issue in this case was whether the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
ruling that officers are never required to knock and announce when
executing a warrant in a felony drug investigation was constitutional.
The rationale for this exception was that the general culture surrounding the drug trade includes the violent use of weapons as well as the
30

31
32
33
3
35
36

37

Id at 931-32.
Id at 934.
Id at 934-36.

520 US 385 (1997).
Id at 388.
Id.
Id.
Richards, 520 US at 389.

38 See State v Richards, 549 NW2d 218, 219-20 (1996) (finding exigent circumstances always present during the execution of a warrant involving felonious delivery of illegal drugs).
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routine destruction of drugs to evade authorities." The Court found
this rationale unconvincing, because it overgeneralized all felony drug
crimes as dangerous and effectively circumvented the knock-andannounce rule.But while the Court struck down Wisconsin's blanket exception
to the knock-and-announce rule, it nonetheless held that police officers could suspend the rule when they had a reasonable suspicion that
knocking and announcing their presence would either be "dangerous
or futile" or where it would "inhibit the effective investigation of the
crime."" This standard of reasonable suspicion is less onerous than the
probable cause standard in the Fourth Amendment, but the Court
reasoned that a standard of reasonable suspicion struck the appropriate balance between the privacy interests at stake and effective law
enforcement practices.42 The Court noted that the reasonableness of a
police officer's decision to forgo the knock-and-announce requirement must be evaluated at the time of entrance into the dwelling.43
The Court reasoned that while it may be preferable to demonstrate to
a magistrate ahead of time the probable cause supporting a no-knock
warrant, this was not always practicable, and a decision by a magistrate not to grant a no-knock warrant was not a per se bar on knocking without announcing."
In United States v Banks,"s the Court emphasized the need for a
case-by-case determination of how long police officers must wait after
knocking and announcing before they are permitted to break down
the door.4 In Banks, officers executing a search warrant on the defendant's apartment knocked and announced their presence.47 They
waited about fifteen to twenty seconds before breaking down the
door. The defendant had been in the shower and claimed to be utterly

39
Id at 225-26. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned that the violation of privacy involved in a no-knock exception is minimal because the resident would ultimately be unable to
refuse police entry. See Richards,520 US at 393 n 5 (rejecting this argument).
40
Richards, 520 US at 393-94 (pointing out that if per se exceptions to the knock-andannounce rule were allowed in every circumstance where there might be danger to officers or
destruction of evidence, the knock-and-announce rule would be meaningless).
41 Id at 394.
42
Id.
43 Although the officers in Richardshad originally been denied a no-knock warrant by the
magistrate, the Court found this to be immaterial, as it merely demonstrated that when they
appeared before the magistrate, the officers were unable to demonstrate probable cause for such
a warrant. This did not preclude them from making a reasonable assessment of the situation once
they tried to execute the search warrant and found Richards to be noncompliant. Id at 395.
44 Richards, 520 US at 395-96 & n 7.
45 540 US 31 (2003).
46 Id at 41.
47 Id at 33.
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surprised by their entry as he had not heard their knock." The Court
held that "[a]bsent exigency, the police must knock and receive an
actual refusal or wait out the time necessary to infer one." 9
Ultimately, the issue of how long to wait before breaking a door
down is one that must be decided on a case-by-case basis by the lower
courts. The Court noted that the situation could change drastically from
one case to another -police seeking a stolen grand piano may very well
be able to spend more time waiting for an answer than police seeking
evidence that can easily be destroyed (such as cocaine powder).' The
Court rejected the argument that the time police officers must wait before entering should be judged based on the time it would reasonably
take for an occupant to reach the door to answer it-especially when
the evidence sought is, like drugs, easily disposable.s"
3. The knock-and-announce rule is severely limited in
Hudson v Michigan.

Recently, however, the Court curtailed the use of the knock-andannounce rule in a 5-4 decision. In Hudson, the police obtained a warrant to search the house of Booker Hudson.52 Upon arriving at his
home, they announced their presence, then waited approximately three
to five seconds before opening his door and entering his house." The
subsequent search revealed large quantities of cocaine, as well as a
loaded gun in the chair in which Hudson was sitting.4 Writing for the
majority, Justice Antonin Scalia articulated three interests protected by
the knock-and-announce rule: the protection of life and limb, the protection of property, and the protection of privacy and dignity."
Justice Scalia pointed out that the first of these interestsprotection of life and limb-is implicated in the knock-and-announce
context because individuals typically are very protective of their
homes. An unannounced entry is likely to provoke a violent selfdefensive reaction-a fact that, in connection with a legal search,
could threaten an officer's life. Justice Scalia also pointed out that the
protection of property is implicated in the knock-and-announce rule
48
49

So
51

Id.
Banks, 540 US at 43.
Id at 41-42.
Id at 40 (pointing out that because of the variation in house size, it would be nearly

impossible for police to judge reasonable transit time, particularly when there is a high risk of
destruction of evidence).
52

547 US at 588.

53

Id.

54

Id.
Id at 594.
Hudson, 547 US at 594.
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because the common law expressly gave individuals the chance to
comply with the law in order to avoid damage to suspects' houses."
Finally, Justice Scalia pointed out that if an officer does not announce
his presence, a suspect can be caught in an undignified and embarrassing state, thus implicating her privacy interests.m During the brief period between an officer knocking and entering the home, individuals
are able to dress appropriately or pull themselves out of bed to prepare for an encounter with the law. While the knock-and-announce
rule can be said to protect all three of these vital interests, Justice Scalia reasoned that it certainly does not protect one's interest in destroying evidence described in a warrant." Justice Scalia pointed out that
although the exclusionary rule need not apply for knock-andannounce violations, potential plaintiffs would still have a remedy for
civil damages under § 1983."

In summary, officers must generally knock and announce their
presence prior to breaking down a door. In some situations, such as
where the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the defendant is
dangerous, or where the evidence is likely to be disposed of, the officer
may forgo the knock-and-announce requirement. This rule protects
vital interests in property, life and limb, and privacy. The required
wait time after knocking and announcing should be reviewed on a
case-by-case basis and may be different for different types of crimes.
II. WILSON AND THE "FAILURE TO IDENTIFY"

Recently, courts have confronted the question of whether the
knock-and-announce rule articulated in Wilson v Arkansas and its
progeny should extend to cases where police officers (usually dressed
in plain clothes) do not identify themselves as police officers before
arresting a suspect. Proponents of extending Wilson argue for a rule
similar to knock and announce, where an officer who fails to identify
himself when conducting an arrest would be civilly liable for constitutional violations.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60

Hudson, 547 US at 597.

It is important to note that suspects are not "seized" per the Fourth Amendment until
officers either physically lay hands on the suspect or the suspect submits to their authority. See
California v Hodari D., 499 US 621, 626 (1991). Like the knock-and-announce rule, however, a
rule requiring officers to identify themselves would help guard against a subsequent unreasonable
61
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This Part surveys cases in which plaintiffs have argued for a rule
requiring officers to identify themselves. Thus far, no circuit court has
extended the knock-and-announce rule in Wilson, while only one of
the three district courts to touch on this issue has done so explicitly.
A. Circuit Courts Have Been Reluctant to Extend Wilson
The First Circuit was the first to consider whether to extend the
knock-and-announce rule to situations where an officer fails to identify himself.6 The plainclothes police officers in this case had obtained
an arrest warrant for Philip St. Hilaire. The police knew that St. Hi63
laire was dangerous and probably armed. Prior to attempting to arrest him, the officers conferred and decided that the best way to proceed was to make sure that St. Hilaire understood that they were police officers, as he had dealt with the police several times before and
had always been compliant.6 When the officers arrived at St. Hilaire's
place of work, they found that he was already leaving and heading for
his car.6 ' They then decided to execute the warrant.6 The plainclothes
officers ran at his car with their guns drawn. St. Hilaire saw them,
reached for his own weapon-and was shot in the neck.6 ' The officers
claimed to have yelled that they were police as they ran at his car, but
St. Hilaire and several bystanders disputed this assertion." When they
reached the car, St. Hilaire, bleeding from his neck, said: "I didn't
know you guys were the cops. Why didn't he identify himself? Why
didn't he say he was a cop?"6 St. Hilaire repeated these questions to
seizure by putting the suspect on notice that she is encountering the law and affording her a
chance to comply.
62 The two cases discussed in this Part fell on either side of the Court's rulings in Wilson v
Layne, 536 US 603 (1999), and Pearson v Callahan,129 S Ct 808 (2009). St. Hilaire v City of
Laconia,71 F3d 20 (1st Cir 1995), was decided prior to the Court's requirement in Layne that
circuit courts first decide whether a constitutional right has been violated and only then move on
to whether the right was clearly established when deciding qualified immunity. Before Layne,
courts were allowed to proceed with the qualified immunity analysis as they saw fit. Catlin v City
of Wheaton, 574 F3d 361 (7th Cir 2009), meanwhile, was decided after the Court's ruling in Pearson that overruled Layne and returned the order of the qualified immunity analysis to the district court's discretion. Thus, while it may appear that the First and Seventh Circuits misapplied
the qualified immunity analysis, the decisions are reflective of the fluctuating tests laid down by
the Supreme Court.
63 St. Hilaire,71 F3d at 22 (noting that the police had information that St. Hilaire possibly carried or possessed a .357 caliber revolver, a .25 caliber semiautomatic pistol, a shotgun,
and a crossbow).
6
Id at 22-23.
65
Id at 23.
66 Id.
67
St. Hilaire,71 F3d at 23.
6
Id (summarizing the officers' individual testimony that they had identified themselves
but noting that a motorist eyewitness testified that he just heard "Freeze").
69
Id.
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hospital workers and his wife."o He was paralyzed from the neck down
as a result of his injuries and subsequently died from complications.
The First Circuit did not foreclose extending Wilson but nevertheless dismissed the plaintiff's § 1983 suit through qualified immunity. The court noted that Wilson had not been decided at the time of
the incident" and that the identification requirement needed to have
been clearly rooted in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence at the time
of the shooting for the plaintiff to prevail." Thus, while not ruling out
the possibility of Wilson's future extension, the court dismissed the
case, holding that qualified immunity applied because the law was not
clear at the time of the shooting."
The most recent circuit court to address this issue was the Seventh
Circuit in Catlin v City of Wheaton.' The case was a § 1983 suit brought
against two police officers for a violation of the plaintiff's Fourth
Amendment rights. The police officers sued in this case were conducting a manhunt for a suspect as part of a drug sting operation." The suspect was known to be armed and highly dangerous and had previously
threatened police officers with violent force." While searching for the
suspect, the officers (dressed in plain clothes) saw Jonathan Catlin leaving the parking lot of a Red Roof Inn where the suspect was thought to
be staying." Catlin substantially resembled the suspect and was driving
a motorcycle. The police officers pulled up behind Catlin at a red light,
exited their car, and tackled Catlin off of his motorcycle." At no point
did they identify themselves as police officers.9 Catlin, believing he was
under attack by criminals, fought back, broke away, and began running." The officers tackled him again and handcuffed him. Only after
Catlin was handcuffed did the police identify themselves. After about

70

Id.
St. Hilaire, 71 F3d at 23 (noting that the incident occurred in 1990 while Wilson was
decided in 1995).
72
Id at 23-24.
73 Id at 27-28.
74 574 F3d 361 (7th Cir 2009). Because the issue on appeal was whether to uphold summary judgment against the plaintiff, the Seventh Circuit accepted the plaintiffs version of the
facts as true. See id at 364.
75 Id at 363.
76 Id.
77 Id at 363-64.
78
Catlin, 574 F3d at 364.
79 Id at 364 n 2 (expressing some reservation about this factual description because Catlin
admitted that the defendants were wearing police badges and that he heard them refer to themselves as police officers).
8o Id at 364.
71
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twenty minutes, they realized their mistake and released him." The altercation damaged Catlin's motorcycle.The Seventh Circuit distinguished between the officers' initial failure to identify and their failure to identify themselves after they tackled
Catlin from his motorcycle." The court postulated that "there was nothing unreasonable about the defendants' initial failure to identify themselves."" The police had a reasonable belief that Catlin was armed and
likely to violently resist arrest. The element of surprise was crucial in
apprehending him. In addition, the officers were authorized to execute
an arrest warrant against a suspect fitting Catlin's description. But the
court characterized the continuing failure to identify once Catlin was
removed from his motorcycle as "problematic."" Thus, it was the execution of the seizure that posed possible Fourth Amendment concerns.
But while this failure to identify was "problematic," the court concluded that it was not firmly established that Wilson was applicable to
this set of facts." The court pointed out that it was aware of no other
circuit court to have extended Wilson and that the district courts were
divided on the issue." Because the law had not clearly been established
at the time of the incident, the Seventh Circuit ruled that qualified immunity applied and affirmed the district court's dismissal."
District Courts Appear Divided over Whether to Extend Wilson
District courts have been surprisingly silent on the issue of whether
to extend Wilson. The only court squarely to address the possible extension of Wilson was the Western District of Missouri. In Johnson v
Grob," police officers in plain clothes set up a roadblock to capture Toni Johnson.9' When Johnson arrived at the roadblock, the police officers
did not identify themselves. Upon seeing the plainclothes officers blocking the road with guns drawn, Johnson panicked and tried to reverse her
car in an attempt to flee." Her car crashed into another car and flipped
over." A police officer pulled her from the car and handcuffed her.
B.

81

82

83
84

85
86

Id.
Catlin, 574 F3d at 364.
Id at 368.

Id.
Id.

Catlin, 574 F3d at 368-69.

Id at 369 ("tElven if the defendants had consulted a casebook prior to formulating their
plans, they still would not have had fair notice.").
88 Id at 369-70.
89 928 F Supp 889 (WD Mo 1996).
90 Id at 894.
91 Id at 895.
87

92

Id.
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Johnson sustained cuts, bruises, and other physical injuries as well as
posttraumatic stress disorder as a result of the altercation.9
The district court held that the test for a proper show of authority
is "not whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the officer's words and actions would
have conveyed that to a reasonable person."9 The court reasoned that
"it would be foolish to require citizens to assume that armed assailants
are law enforcement officers rather than malicious hooligans";" most
citizens will comply with law enforcement once the officers are identified as such. When the officers did not identify themselves, however,
fight or flight are both reasonable and foreseeable reactions when the
person is confronted by unidentified persons brandishing weapons.
Johnson argued that she would not have tried to flee from the police
roadblock if the officers had identified themselves. The fact that the
officers did not identify themselves led Johnson to flee the scene, just as
she would have had the officers been carjackers."
The court pointed out that Wilson rests on precisely this assumption: individuals are more likely than not to comply with police officers. Any time law enforcement officers use their authority to coerce
a search or seizure, there are risks to personal safety and property.When citizens flee or fight unidentified police officers, these reactions
can result in injury to the police officers effecting an arrest, to the suspect, or to third parties present at the scene.9 With this in mind, the
court held that seizures can be unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment when the arresting officer does not show or declare his
authority." The court was careful, however, to hold that a failure to
identify is not unreasonable per se; it is simply one factor in the mix of
factors considered in the Fourth Amendment's general reasonableness inquiry."o, Despite finding a constitutional violation by interpreting
Wilson to extend to failures to identify, the court granted the police
qualified immunity because the law was not firmly established.
Johnson, 928 F Supp at 895.
Id at 898 ("Implicit in this definition is the requirement that the officers reasonably
convey that the officers have legal authority to order compliance.").
95 Id at 900.
96
Id.
9
Johnson, 928 F Supp at 904-05.
98
Id at 905 (noting that Wilson could not be distinguished on the basis that it occurred
within a home).
99 Id at 906.
100 Id (noting that fight and flight responses are best avoided whenever possible).
101Johnson, 928 F Supp at 906 (listing factors such as the officer's need for quick action, the
severity of the crime, the threat of the suspect to others' safety, and whether the suspect was
resisting arrest or attempting to flee).
102 Id at 909.
93
94
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The District of Kansas has granted relief in a similar situation. In
Newell v City of Salina,"0 the plaintiff was walking around her suburban
neighborhood at night engaged in an idiosyncratic arm-exercise routine.m' An officer saw her walking across a deserted street, suspected
that she might be intoxicated, and approached her from behind and
told her to stop.105 The plaintiff replied, "No," and began walking toward a lit porch. At this point, the officer grabbed her from behind.""
The plaintiff broke his hold and continued walking toward the lit
porch.'" A second officer then tackled her to the ground and handcuffed her." Only once the plaintiff was placed into the officers' vehicle
did she realize that they were police officers. As a result of the altercation, the plaintiff suffered multiple bruises and claimed that the episode
exacerbated a preexisting panic attack condition.' The court held that
"[i]t would have been objectively reasonable for the officers to have
identified themselves as such, prior to using any degree of force to effect the plaintiff's arrest."no. Furthermore, the court held that it may
very well have been objectively unreasonable for police to use an arm
bar to subdue a person suspected of intoxication, at night, without identifying themselves. The court allowed this case to proceed to a jury to
adjudicate whether the officers' use of force was reasonable."
A possible distinction between this case and the other cases that
have been considered thus far is that the officer in Newell was in full
uniform, not plain clothes. But the incident took place at night and
the officer approached from behind, so it is logical to assume that the
plaintiff did not know she was dealing with a police officer.112

Only two circuits have addressed whether there is a constitutional duty of officer identification. The First Circuit found itself unable to
consider the application of Wilson because the events at issue had
276 F Supp 2d 1148 (D Kan 2003).
Id at 1151 (explaining the plaintiffs arm exercise routine as consisting of "pumping her
arms to her side 16 times, then circling her arms forward 16 times, circling her arms backwards 16
times, then raising her hands until they touched above her head and then back down to her side
four times," repeating this motion as she walked).
103
104

105 Id.
106
107
108

Id.
Newell, 276 F Supp 2d at 1151.
Id at 1152.

109 Id.

Id at 1154.
Ill Newell,276 F Supp 2d at 1155.
112 See id at 1153-54 (noting that the plaintiffs stated intent was to evade the assault of a
stranger, not to evade the police).
110
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taken place prior to the issuance of that decision. The Seventh Circuit,
meanwhile, was unwilling to be the first court of appeals to analyze
fully the constitutionality of the failure to identify. Only one district
court has directly addressed the issue, and it has found that Wilson
does extend. The court in Newell did not dismiss the claim and left it
for a jury to consider whether the officer's actions were reasonable.
III. COURTS SHOULD ADOPT A RULE REQUIRING OFFICERS TO
IDENTIFY THEMSELVES IN MOST CIRCUMSTANCES
While no one disputes that the police had probable cause to conduct the above seizures, whether they were executed unreasonably under the Fourth Amendment remains unclear. Part III.A argues that the
logic of Wilson suggests that the seizures were conducted unreasonably,
because the protected interests identified by Justice Scalia in Hudson-the protection of life, property, and privacy-are all present in
the failure-to-identify context. In addition, empirical research on coercion and compliance demonstrates that individuals are more likely than
not to comply with an authority's request or demand. Part III.B argues
that there is no categorical bar to extending Fourth Amendment protections beyond the home and that officer safety would not be overly
burdened by a rule requiring identification. Finally, Part III.C concludes by suggesting that courts should hold that the failure to identify
is an unreasonable seizure that, subject to exceptions, violates the
Fourth Amendment. This would allow suits to proceed past qualified
immunity in order to compensate injured plaintiffs adequately.
A.

Hudson's Articulated Interests Are Implicated in Instances
Where an Officer Fails to Identify Himself

Writing for the majority in Hudson, Justice Scalia articulated in
dicta three vital interests protected by the knock-and-announce rule.'
The first was the protection of life and limb: an unannounced entry
into a home could provoke a violent self-defensive reaction from a
suspect who believed his dwelling was being assaulted unlawfully."'
The second was the protection of property: at common law, the
knock-and-announce rule protected suspects' homes from unnecessary damage."' The final interest was basic privacy and dignity: the
knock-and-announce rule allows suspects an "opportunity to prepare
themselves for" an encounter with the police."' This Part addresses
113
114
115
116

See 547 US at 594.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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these interests in turn and demonstrates that each is implicated when
an officer fails to identify himself to a suspect when seizing him.
1. When officers fail to identify themselves, a suspect's confused
reaction can result in injury and death.
The failure to identify has resulted in injuries ranging from the
mild (abrasions) to the serious (paralysis below the neck). In Beran v
United States,"' the plaintiff was driving in front of the White House
when the car in front of him began moving very slowly."' Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the car contained two Secret Service agents.
After a series of escalating incidents of road rage, the agents pulled in
front of the plaintiff and stopped abruptly, causing him to impact their
car.1 20 A Secret Service agent got out of the vehicle, grabbed the plaintiff's tie through an open window, and began punching the plaintiff in
the head.121 The agent tried forcibly to remove the plaintiff from his
car, but failed because of the plaintiff's seatbelt.122 The plaintiff panicked, put his car into reverse, and dragged the agent for approximately sixty-five feet before the agent let go of the vehicle.'
It is easy to see the danger of injury in the Beran case. It seems
reasonable to hypothesize that James Beran might have avoided angering the agents altogether had he known their identity. Not only
was the plaintiff accosted and struck in the head several times by the
Secret Service agent, but in reaction to the assault, the plaintiff attempted to flee the scene. A failure by an officer to disclose his identity makes it more likely that a suspect will react unpredictably, and
perhaps even violently, when the officer attempts to subdue her during the arrest. When officers fail to identify themselves, not only is
there an increased danger to the suspect that they are attempting to
apprehend, but there is also a real physical danger to the officers
themselves. In Beran's case, his flight caught the Secret Service
agent on Beran's car door, causing him to be dragged for approximately sixty-five feet. It is not hard to imagine that this incident
could have resulted in the serious injury, or even death, of the arresting Secret Service agent.
Indeed, such serious injury has resulted from suspects trying to flee
from an unidentified officer. The plaintiff in Gutierrez-Rodriguez v
117

759 F Supp 886 (DDC 1991).

118 id at 888.
119 Id.
120
121
122
123

Id at 888--89 (narrating an exchange of obscenities leading up to the final collision).
Beran, 759 F Supp at 889.
Id.
Id.
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Cartagena24 was a twenty-two year old with no criminal record who,
with his girlfriend, decided to park his car in a secluded spot to appreciate the lights of distant San Juan.'" A group of undercover officers
happened to be conducting preventative rounds in an effort to disrupt
the local drug trade." Upon seeing Gutierrez's car parked with its lights
off, the officers exited their car and approached with their guns drawn.
At no point did they identify themselves. When Gutierrez saw the unidentified officers approaching his car with their guns drawn, he started
his engine and tried to drive away. " The officers opened fire, and one
bullet struck Gutierrez in the back, causing him to lose control of the
vehicle, which flew off the road and landed in a ditch on its side." As a
result of the gunshot wound, Gutierrez was permanently paralyzed
from the waist down.29
The court in Gutierrez-Rodriguezupheld an action under § 1983,
holding that the indifference to human life exhibited by the officers
rose to the level of "being deliberate, reckless, or callous."'. Despite
the plaintiff's success in obtaining recovery against the officers, it is
hard to ignore that such recovery would not have been necessary in
the first place had the officers identified themselves prior to approaching the plaintiff's vehicle with their guns drawn.
Individuals often react to perceived attempts to deprive them of
their life and property with violent self-help."2 For example, in Jackson v Sauls,133 a failure to identify led to a deadly shootout. After tailing the plaintiffs' car, several undercover police officers developed a
suspicion that the car was stolen.3 When the plaintiffs parked their
124
125
126
127
128
129

882 F2d 553 (1st Cir 1989).
Id at 557.
Id.
Id.
Gutierrez-Rodriguez,882 F2d at 557.

Id.
Id at 562.
131 Similar instances of injury resulting from a failure to identify have occurred in numerous
other cases. See for example, Carter v Rogers, 805 F2d 1153, 1156 (4th Cir 1986); Newell, 276
F Supp 2d at 1152; Johnson,928 F Supp at 894.
132 This right to violent self-help is centered around the home, where there is no duty to
retreat in the common law. See D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept,46 Santa Clara L
Rev 255, 260-63 (2006) (noting that the common law permits individuals to use deadly force in
their homes to repel intruders). Recently, Florida has enacted a statute expanding the right to
violent self-defense to include situations where individuals are confronted with aggression in
their automobiles as well as their homes. The Florida law also allows violent self-help regardless
of whether the threat of force is imminent. See Fla Stat Ann § 776.012-13 (West). See also Anthony J. Sebok, Florida'sNew "Stand Your Ground" Law: Why It's More Extreme Than Other
130

States' Self-Defense Measures, and How It Got That Way, FindLaw (May 2, 2005), online at

http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20050502.html (visited Oct 9,2010).
133 206 F3d 1156 (11th Cir 2000).
134 Id at 1160-61.
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car and entered a motorcycle shop, the police followed them to the
store.135 Later, a car crash on the street outside of the shop prompted
the plaintiffs and the shop owners to run outside to see what had happened. At that point, the undercover officers drew their weapons,
yelled obscenities at the plaintiffs, and told them to get back into the
shop.' At no point did the officers identify themselves as police."
Once the lead officer entered the shop, the shop owner (who was not
among the plaintiffs) drew his weapon and opened fire on the officer,
hitting him several times.' The other officers returned fire and killed
one of the plaintiffs who was lying unarmed on the ground."
This case demonstrates the danger when unidentified officers attempt to seize individuals. To the plaintiffs and the shop owner, the
police appeared to be common criminals who were attempting to rob
the motorcycle shop. Once the officer entered the shop, the shop
owner exercised his common law right to defend his property by
opening fire. Not only did this injure one of the arresting officers, but
it also prompted a violent reaction from the police. This culminated in
the death of an innocent plaintiff who was attempting to submit to the
armed officers by lying on the ground. By not identifying themselves,
not only did the officers endanger the plaintiffs and nearby third parties, but they also risked their own lives unnecessarily and prompted a
shootout that arguably would not have taken place had they given
notice to those present that they were plainclothes police.
2. In addition to the serious danger to life and limb, when
officers fail to identify themselves, unnecessary damage
to a suspect's property may occur.
When officers fail to identify themselves and violence becomes
necessary to apprehend a suspect, damage to the suspect's property
often results. In Hudson, Justice Scalia reiterated that an essential
interest that the knock-and-announce rule protects is the preservation
of a suspect's property." This interest in property preservation was
first recognized in Wilson when Justice Clarence Thomas pointed out
that the common law abhorred the destruction of property and instead

135 Idat1161.
136 Id at 1162.

Jackson, 206 F3d at 1162.
Id.
139 Id.
140 Id at 1173.
141 547 US at 594 (noting that breaking into a house without notice would penalize individuals who would otherwise cooperate with the law). See also Wilson, 514 US at 931-34 (summarizing the common law history of announcement requirements).
137
138
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sought to preserve personal property if possible.14 The damage in
question in a knock-and-announce case is typically only that necessary
to enter a home-that is, broken windows and doors. In the failure-toidentify context, by contrast, property damage resulting from an officer's failure to identify himself often involves automobiles.
In Agresta v Gillespie. and Gutierrez-Rodriguez,for instance, the

plaintiffs both suffered damage to their cars as a result of the police
firing upon their vehicles."' In Beran, as a result of the Secret Service
agents' aggressive driving, Beran's vehicle crashed into the agents'
vehicle.'45 Finally, in Johnson, when the plaintiff attempted to flee
from the unidentified officers, she crashed into their vehicle and her
car flipped over. What each of these cases demonstrates is that regardless of whether the plaintiffs reacted violently to the police, the
confusion resulting from an officer's failure to identify himself can
result in flight by the plaintiffs in an effort to avoid capture by an unidentified assailant. This flight can provoke violence from the police,
which can in turn cause automobile accidents and damage to vehicles.
If we are to take seriously the Court's articulated interest in
avoiding unnecessary damage to suspects' property in the search and
seizure context, it seems reasonable to include damage to plaintiffs'
vehicles under the umbrella of protected property interests. Indeed,
the cost of the damage to the average car is likely to be significantly
higher than the cost of damage to the average window or door. In
most of the cases examined thus far, an officer's enunciation of her
identity as a police officer would likely have mitigated the probability
of damage. Once suspects are informed that they are dealing with the
police, they must decide whether to cooperate or resist. If suspects
choose resistance, subsequent damage to their vehicles may very well
be necessary to complete the seizure. If the suspect complies, however, unnecessary damage to her vehicle is easily averted. By disclosing
their identities in the process of effecting a seizure, police officers help
suspects avoid unnecessary damage to their property by offering them
the opportunity to comply with the law.

Wilson, 514 US at 931-33.
631 A2d 772 (Pa Commw Ct 1993).
144 See id at 774 (describing how when fleeing in his car from unidentified police, Samuel
Agresta was killed by a shotgun blast to the head); Gutierrez-Rodriguez, 882 F2d at 557.
145 759 F Supp at 888-89.
146 928 F Supp at 894-95.
142
143
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3. By unexpectedly accosting suspects, an officer's failure to
identify can provoke embarrassing and uncharacteristic
reactions from individuals who would otherwise comply
fully with law enforcement.
In Hudson, Justice Scalia noted that one of the reasons for the
knock-and-announce rule was to allow individuals privacy and time to
prepare themselves for an encounter with the law."' Justice Scalia recognized that when officers unexpectedly burst into a home, individuals can be caught in embarrassing states and that this harm can be easily avoided by requiring officers to announce their presence prior to
entering. He reasoned that it was important to allow individuals the
opportunity to collect themselves briefly before encountering the law.
Similarly, in the failure-to-identify context, individuals should be
allowed to pull themselves together and make informed decisions about
how to react to an officer's presence. When individuals are coercively
drawn from relative anonymity into the public realm, it is reasonable to
require police to let them know that they are dealing with the law and
not criminals. By identifying themselves, police officers allow individuals the opportunity to decide on a course of action. Will they comply?
Will they fight? Will they run? Many individuals would choose to
comply with government action if given the choice. While the dangers
to a suspect's privacy and dignity are not nearly as great in public as in
the home, individuals still have an interest in maintaining the appearance and sophistication of law-abiding citizens.
B.

A Rule Requiring Identification Is Not Limited to the Home and
Does Not Undermine Officer Safety

This Part proceeds by addressing several arguments against a rule
requiring officers to identify themselves when conducting arrests.
Part III.B.1 argues that the home's special legal significance does not
preclude the extension of Fourth Amendment protections beyond the
home. Part III.B.2 asserts that the increased difficulty of identifying
the correct suspects in the public arena suggests that officers take
even more precautions than they do in the home. Finally, Part III.B.3
concludes by demonstrating that police officers' safety would not be
undermined by a rule requiring identification, because the holding in
Richards relaxes the proposed requirement when an officer has a
reasonable suspicion that identifying himself would result in increased danger.

147

547 US at 594.
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1. Despite the specialized protection of the home, it makes sense
to extend the knock-and-announce rule outside of the home.
The home has traditionally enjoyed special protection in the
common law. Inside the home, individuals have no duty to retreat
when confronted with a dangerous intruder. ' They are also granted
additional privacy rights, free speech protections, and rights against
the government's ability to search for illicit and obscene material.149
But keeping in mind the Supreme Court's famous admonition that the
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,"'%we are able to
see that although the home does indeed enjoy special protection, this
does not preclude constitutionally recognized protection from extending outside the home.
In an early case involving the wiretapping of a suspect's telephone, Olmstead v United States,'" the Court closely tied Fourth
Amendment protection to physical trespass of the home. Writing for
the majority, Chief Justice William Howard Taft noted repeatedly
that wiretapping a home involved no physical trespass.15 Taft concluded by explaining that no federal decision had ever held the Fourth
Amendment to be violated when there was not an actual physical invasion of a house or its curtilage for the purposes of making a seizure,
and that without such a physical invasion, there was no Fourth
Amendment violation.
Katz v United States

overruled Olmstead, holding that even if

wiretapping did not involve a physical intrusion of the home, individuals were still protected from searches when they had a reasonable
expectation of privacy.' In Katz, the defendant had been wiretapped
by the police while making phone calls from a public telephone booth.
Justice Potter Stewart asserted that the "Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places" and denied the government's efforts to rigidly
confine the Fourth Amendment's protection to the home.' This

148 See Barros, 46 Santa Clara L Rev at 261 (cited in note 132) (explaining that many states
have adopted the common law "castle doctrine," which provides that a person has no duty to
retreat when attacked in her home).
149 See id at 259-76.
150 Katz v United States, 389 US 347, 351 (1967) (rejecting the government's attempt to limit
the Fourth Amendment's protections to the home).
151 277 US 438 (1928).
152 See, for example, id at 457,464-66.
153 Id at 466.
154 389 US 347 (1967).
155 Id at 351-52 (concluding that a person who enters a phone booth, "shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the
words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world").
156 Id at 351.
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shows that even though the home is an area of heightened legal protection, there is no bar against extending Fourth Amendment protection to the activities of individuals outside of its walls.
Similarly, in the failure-to-identify context, it is certainly true that
the knock-and-announce rule was formulated with the special protection of the home in mind. But a close examination of the reasons behind the knock-and-announce rule as articulated in Hudson, as well as
empirical research on coercion and compliance,' demonstrates that
the Fourth Amendment should be read broadly to protect "people"
who are confronted with an unidentified assailant in the form of a
police officer rather than simply the "place" of the home. When the
reasons behind protecting the home from unidentified intrusion are
the same as those for protecting individuals from arrest by unidentified officers, the Fourth Amendment's protections logically apply regardless of location. Finally, when the police seek to search the home
of a suspect without knocking and announcing their presence, it is
largely the suspect's privacy interest that is compromised. In contrast,
in the failure-to-identify context it is not a suspect's privacy interest
that is largely at issue, but instead his interest in freedom from an unreasonable restraint on his liberty-that is to say, his interest in being
free from unreasonable seizure. Just as the law protects the home, so
should it not force individuals to remain inside for fear of being unreasonably seized by unidentified individuals.
2. The increased difficulty of identifying suspects in public
should compel officers to identify themselves prior to
seizing individuals.
When the police conduct searches of homes, they generally must
first acquire a warrant from a judge or magistrate and demonstrate
probable cause for intruding upon an individual's home."' This often
means that the suspect at issue has been the subject of an ongoing
investigation and that the police are seeking to take the investigation
to the next level. In cases like this, the risk of the police searching the
wrong house (and thereby searching completely innocent individuals)
157 The location of the home is not dispositive in providing protection under the Fourth
Amendment. As seen in Katz, a mere glass phone booth can provide Fourth Amendment protection to an individual in public. Likewise, being inside a home does not necessarily guarantee
Fourth Amendment protection. See, for example, Minnesota v Carter, 525 US 83, 96-97 (1998)
(Scalia concurring) (arguing that Fourth Amendment protection in the home does not extend to
all guests). Regardless of location, the Fourth Amendment is an individual right and the location
of the home is not dispositive regarding whether protection attaches.
158 See notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
159 See Michigan v Fisher, 130 S Ct 546, 548 (2009) ("[S]earches and seizures inside a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.").
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is relatively small. A suspect's house serves as a valuable landmark for
identity and lets police know that when they enter a given home, they
are likely to encounter the suspect they are seeking or her associates.
In the case of street arrests, this is simply not the case. Unlike the
home, there is no valuable landmark for discerning an individual's
identity quickly and safely. This makes it much more likely that police
will apprehend (and possibly use force against) innocent people. We
have seen examples of this in Catlin, Newell, Gutierrez-Rodriguez, and
Jackson.'6' In all of these cases, innocent individuals were accosted by
the police and injury resulted. The police in Catlin, for example, were
given a photograph of the suspect they were pursuing and were directed to the area he was known to frequent. Upon seeing Catlin, who
looked substantially like the suspect"' and was riding a motorcycle
similar to the suspect's, the police undertook the process of seizing
him for arrest. What made the subsequent seizure unreasonable was
not that the police misidentified a suspect-indeed, it seems perfectly
reasonable for them to have done so, as the description with which
they were provided closely matched Catlin. Nor was it unreasonable
for the police to attempt to quickly remove a possibly violent individual from the streets. Rather, it was unreasonable for the officers not
to have identified themselves as soon as they could safely do so. This
would have insured that Catlin knew with whom he was dealing and
would have allowed him to act accordingly.
When attempting to apprehend individuals in public, we can expect that from time to time cases of mistaken identity will happen.
These reasonable mistakes are the byproduct of the snap decisions
required by law enforcementl6 as well as the fallibility of human perception. But this is precisely why a rule requiring identification is
normatively desirable. The fact that police officers may be more likely
to encounter or injure innocent people while doing undercover street
searches for dangerous suspects indicates that they should take greater precautions to make sure that individuals know with whom they are
dealing and are given the opportunity to comply. Therefore, while it
certainly makes sense to announce one's identity when entering a
home as part of a search, the increased likelihood of simply "grabbing

160 See Catlin, 574 F3d at 363-64; Newell, 276 F Supp 2d at 1151-52; Gutierrez-Rodriguez,
882 F2d at 557; Jackson, 206 F3d at 1161-63.
161 Catlin, 574 F3d at 365 n 4 (finding that the suspect and Catlin had approximately the
same age, hair style, weight, race, and facial appearance).
162 See Roy v Inhabitantsof City of Lewiston, 42 F3d 691, 695 (1st Cir 1994) (stating that
"splitsecond" judgments in "tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving" circumstances require a
"comparatively generous" standard of reasonableness) (quotation marks omitted).
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the wrong guy" makes a rule requiring officer identification in public
places all the more necessary.
3. A rule requiring officer identification does not undermine
officer safety.
The principal argument against requiring officers to identify
themselves prior to conducting a public arrest is that such a requirement would be unnecessarily burdensome to police and may place
them in danger. Dealing with dangerous suspects often necessitates
undercover, plainclothes operations where police must conceal their
identities in order to apprehend the suspect safely. Recall Catlin:m
The police were on a manhunt for an individual who was known to be
armed and highly dangerous and who had threatened police previously. Secrecy was necessary in order to bring the suspect to justice safely. The Seventh Circuit recognized, however, that it was necessary to
draw a distinction between the initial failure to identify and the subsequent failure to disclose police identity once the element of surprise
was lost.'6 While it may have initially been necessary to avoid disclosing police identity in order to maintain the element of surprise, it
seems reasonable to require the police to identify themselves after the
element of surprise has passed. In Catlin, after the officers had tackled
Catlin from his motorcycle, but before they had placed him in handcuffs, they could have easily disclosed their identity without risking
additional harm to themselves. Indeed, this may have prompted Catlin to comply with the police instead of resisting under the belief that
criminals were assaulting him.
If, as this Comment suggests, the knock-and-announce rule articulated in Wilson should be extended to the failure-to-identify context, it makes sense to incorporate the rest of the Supreme Court's
holdings in the Wilson line of cases as well. Officer safety should be a
paramount concern of the courts. This includes the rule articulated in
Richards-allowing officers to suspend the knock-and-announce rule
when they have reasonable suspicion that announcing their presence
would be dangerous or futile or would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime. Under an extension of Richards, when police have

See notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
Catlin, 574 F3d at 368 (describing the officers' continuing failure to disclose their identities as "problematic").
165 Richards, 520 US at 394 (allowing police to meet the lower standard of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause because this allows for the proper balance of law enforcement
interests and individual interests).
163
164
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a reasonable suspicion'6 that a suspect will react to police identification with either violence or an attempt to flee, officers would be able
to suspend the normal requirement of identifying themselves prior to
effecting an arrest. In most cases, however, it should be reasonable for
police to disclose their identities after the element of surprise has
been lost. This allows police to maintain the element of surprise for
dangerous individuals while simultaneously protecting suspects from
confusion over the identity of undercover agents.
Even when officers do not possess reasonable suspicion, empirical evidence shows that their safety is unlikely to be in jeopardy. Empirical research demonstrates that individuals are likely to comply
with the request of a police officer even if they have been informed
that they have a right to refuse such a request. Indeed, this happens
over and over again in cases where a suspect in possession of drugs is
informed of her constitutional right to refuse a search yet decides to
comply anyway.'6 Janice Nadler has identified two important principles in the social psychology of compliance: authority and social validation."' Nadler points out that "[c]omplying with authorities is
something that we do quickly, on the spot, without conscious deliberation.", Because decisions to comply with authority typically arise in
situations where time is a constant pressure, individuals use symbols
of authority as a mental shortcut for quickly making the best decision.
Even when individuals might prefer to refuse (and even have the right
to do so), symbols of authority are so powerful that they will override
individual preference."' Similarly, individuals are much more likely to
comply with authority when it appears that others have already done

166 Reasonable suspicion is a standard used in other criminal contexts as well. See, for example, Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 21 (1968) (holding that in order to justify a "stop and frisk," police
must be able to justify the intrusion by pointing to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion). In the failureto-identify context, police officers would use a similar standard when assessing whether they
could suspend the general requirement of informing individuals of their identity.
167

See Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002

S Ct Rev 153,165-97.
168 See, for example, Florida v Bostick, 501 US 429, 431-33 (1991) (involving a defendant
who was informed of his right to refuse a search but nevertheless consented and was revealed to
be holding cocaine).
169 Nadler, 2002 S Ct Rev at 173 (cited in note 167) (arguing that police officers have strong
influence over people because "their position of authority signals that they possess information
and power that is greater than our own").
170 Id at 174.
171 Id at 178-79 (discussing several experiments where individuals were coerced into false
confessions simply by being shown false evidence from an authoritative figure suggesting that
they committed an act).
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so.' By witnessing what other individuals have already done, people
try to "fit in" and achieve social validation through compliance. Nadler even notes that it is not always necessary actually to observe others
engaging in compliant behavior; the perception that others comply
rather than resist is enough to influence an individual to acquiesce.17
What this research suggests for the failure-to-identify context is
simple: when confronted with authority, individuals are much more
likely to comply than resist. They will comply even though the guilty
among them may have every incentive to resist. Because identifying
themselves before placing individuals under arrest places little burden
on police officers, they should be required to give suspects the chance
to comply. As suggested above, in instances where such a chance is likely to be dangerous or futile, the rule in Richards would allow officers to
maintain the element of surprise and protect themselves from harm.
C. Imposing Tort Liability through § 1983 Provides Victims with
Just Compensation for Their Injuries While Redistributing
Negligence Costs from Individual Citizens to Society as a Whole
Courts should adopt a rule requiring officers to identify themselves unless they have a reasonable suspicion that doing so would
undermine officer safety. This rule would primarily implicate plaintiffs
suing under § 1983 for violations of their Fourth Amendment rights.
At present, such suits are dismissed on the basis of qualified immunity, as the law has not been clearly established. Courts should articulate a constitutional violation for failure to identify and clearly define
the law so that plaintiffs' suits are allowed going forward.
In pursuing these claims, plaintiffs have asserted general violations
of their constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures.17
Specifically, they allege that when the police fail to identify themselves,
the seizure is unreasonable in its manner of execution. Of course, in
most Fourth Amendment cases, the failure to identify is simply not an
issue, as most police officers are clearly identified as such by their uniforms. But in the subset of cases described in this Comment, this failure
results in damage to person and property and should be considered by
courts to be compelling evidence of an unreasonable seizure.' Police
172 Id at 180 (illustrating the phenomenon by noting that bartenders often place tips in their
own jars to encourage others to do so).
173 Nadler, 2002 S Ct Rev at 182 (cited in note 167).
174 See US Const Amend IV.
175 See, for example, Gutierrez-Rodriguez, 882 F2d at 557 (involving a confrontation resulting in the plaintiffs paralysis from the waist down); Johnson, 928 F Supp at 894-95 (involving a
confrontation that resulted in the plaintiff sustaining cuts and bruises as well as damage to the
plaintiffs car).
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officers should be permitted to forgo identifying themselves only if they
have a reasonable suspicion that doing so would result in a dangerous
response from the suspect or aid in the suspect's escape."' While there
may be exigent factors in some cases allowing officers to avoid identifying themselves, these would be considered by the court when assessing
whether qualified immunity should protect the officers' actions as reasonable. Officers would need to be able to point to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
suggest that identifying themselves would have been dangerous or futile. In any case, allowing these claims to proceed is unlikely to result in
a flood of litigation: plaintiffs are likely to bring suit only when the
damage resulting from a failure to identify is severe, and such severe
cases are by no means commonplace.
At trial, plaintiffs would bring a claim alleging a violation of their
Fourth Amendment rights because of an unreasonable seizure. The
plaintiff would have to prove to the judge (or at least create a genuine
issue of fact) that the officer did not identify himself prior to arresting
the plaintiff and that this failure to identify was the cause of her injuries. The failure to identify would not be unreasonable per se, but
should substantially tilt the balance in favor of the judge finding that
an unreasonable seizure took place-thus overriding the officer's
claim to qualified immunity. Once the suit is allowed to proceed to
trial, the officer would attempt to prove that he had a reasonable suspicion that the plaintiff was going to respond violently or flee if he had
identified himself. This would prove to the jury that the officer's actions were objectively reasonable given the circumstances. If the officer were unable to prove this, the jury would hold him liable for an
unreasonable seizure and make him pay compensatory damages. If
the resulting injury or constitutional violation were particularly egregious, the jury could award punitive damages.
To be sure, some courts already consider whether an officer identified himself when assessing the overall reasonableness of a seizure,
noting correctly that the failure to identify is an important consideration in determining whether a seizure as a whole is reasonable. For
example, in Marshall v West,"' the plaintiff was being pursued by

plainclothes officers for a traffic violation. The officers claimed to
have turned on a light (whether it was working was disputed) and
See Parts III.B.2 and III.B.3.
See Smith v Wade, 461 US 30,54 (1983) (holding that punitive damages may be available in
a § 1983 action "when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or
when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others").
178 See, for example, Johnson, 928 F Supp at 894.
179 559 F Supp 2d 1224 (MD Ala 2008).
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pulled alongside the plaintiff's vehicle holding up their badges to identify themselves." The plaintiff did not pull over, and eventually the
officers used force to stop his car and apprehend him.' The court held
that in evaluating the plaintiff's excessive use of force claim, there was
a legitimate issue of fact regarding whether the officers identified
themselves." This was relevant to the plaintiff's claim: if the officers
had not identified themselves, a forcible stop would not have been
necessary because the plaintiff would not have been "fleeing" from
the police." The court used this failure to identify in conjunction with
other factors (including the severity of the crime, the extent of the
injuries, and the immediacy of the threat) to conclude that the police
officers used excessive force in effecting the seizure.
Ultimately, however, these cases seem to be a small minority.
More courts need to recognize that when injury has resulted from a
seizure where the officer did not identify himself, this failure to identify
provides substantial cause for declaring the seizure as a whole unreasonable. Indeed, in instances such as these, the failure to identify should
be given great weight when assessing the totality of the circumstances
of a seizure's reasonableness and should weigh heavily against qualified
immunity. This will allow these suits to proceed past qualified immunity
and permit injured plaintiffs to argue the issue to a jury.
Allowing these suits under § 1983 serves two purposes: it allows injured plaintiffs compensation for the injuries they wrongly suffer, and it
provides municipalities"' with an incentive to train officers to clearly
identify themselves as police when conducting arrests. By and large,
police officers do not require additional deterrence through personal
liability or application of the exclusionary rule to incentivize them to
identify themselves. Most officers likely already know that if they do
not identify themselves, confusion and violence can result. Police, however, may still make mistakes from time to time and fail to consider
seriously the possible ramifications and violence that can result from
confusion over their identity as agents of the state. Tort liability would

180 Id at
181 Id at

1227.
1229.
182 Id at 1237.
183 Marshall, 559 F Supp at 1237.
18 Id at 1233-40. See also Jones v Flathmann, 2008 WL 918702, *14-15 (MD Ala) (holding
that the officers' refusal to identify themselves, coupled with the hoods they were wearing and
other factors, militated in favor of denying a qualified immunity defense against an excessive use
of force claim).
185Many municipalities indemnify officers against § 1983 suits. See John Jeffries, In Praise
of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 Va L Rev 47, 50 & n 16 (1998) (concluding that

state and local officers can count on indemnification or government defense where they are not
acting in "extreme bad faith").
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incentivize municipalities to take reasonable precautions to prevent
failures by police officers to identify themselves. By conducting officer
training programs, municipalities could quickly and cheaply inform officers that, not only is there a legal requirement of identification (as this
Comment proposes), but it is also in their best interests to identify
themselves in most situations. Requiring officers to identify themselves
is the epitome of cost-justified precaution, as it requires little additional
effort on the officers' part while simultaneously creating the potential
to avoid massive and expensive injury to citizens.
The primary reason for providing tort liability, however, is to allow injured plaintiffs an opportunity to receive just compensation for
their injuries. Through taxes, society as a whole undertakes the expense of providing a law enforcement system. As with any system,
from time to time negligent mistakes will be made when conducting
everyday functions. Sometimes these mistakes involve apprehending
the wrong individual. There is no evidence to suggest that such failures happen frequently; instead, it appears to be a rather rare occurrence that police do not identify themselves. But when such mistaken
arrests do occur, and an individual is injured because of an officer's
failure to identify himself, it makes sense to provide the injured party
with compensation through the tort system. Such recovery equitably
distributes the relatively small risk of negligence by police to society
as a whole instead of imposing it unfairly upon one person.'6 While
the damages in failure-to-identify cases may occasionally be great, the
rare occurrence of such negligence, coupled with the redistribution of
costs to the municipality as a whole, would ensure that this additional
liability does not dramatically overburden society's ability to provide
just compensation to victims.
CONCLUSION

When police officers fail to identify themselves when conducting
an arrest, suspects might react either by attempting to flee the scene
or by using violence in an effort to defend themselves against unidentified individuals. Sometimes, serious injury can result from these
reactions. These injuries can take the form of reputational damage,
embarrassment, property damage, personal injury, and even death. Requiring officers to identify themselves would guard against unnecessary
186 Of course, until a critical mass of courts allow claims alleging a failure to identify, prospective plaintiffs will find themselves frustrated by successful qualified immunity defenses. While
this frustration is certainly unfortunate, it is a necessary consequence of the law that allows officers
a fair opportunity to understand the law's requirements going forward. For further discussion of
how qualified immunity works in this context, see notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
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damage to property. In addition, it would help ensure that suspects
and police officers are not injured or killed needlessly because of confusion regarding the identity of the officers. Empirical research
strongly suggests that individuals are more likely than not to comply
when faced with a symbol of authority. A rule requiring identification
allows citizens who wish to cooperate with the government to do so
and allows individuals to conduct themselves with dignity and restraint when confronted suddenly by the law.
Because this proposed rule could be suspended in cases where
the officers have reasonable suspicion that a suspect would react to
identification with violence or flight, the burden on police would be
slight. Thus, it seems clear that courts should allow tort recovery for
plaintiffs who have been injured as a result of a failure to identify. In a
free society, it is essential to provide individuals with as much notice
as possible of state action against them. This avoids requiring individuals to assume that those who accost them are police officers. Not
only does such a requirement prevent confusion on the part of suspects, but it also avoids deadly confrontation with the police. Allowing recovery through the tort system is the best solution for victims of
a failure to identify. Such recovery provides the minimal deterrence
necessary to incentivize municipalities to instruct their officers of this
requirement, while simultaneously shifting the burden of negligence
from individual plaintiffs to society as a whole.

187 A rule requiring identification should not be overly complicated by requiring officers to
disclose a lengthy list of information including their names, badge numbers, units, office affiliations, and so on. Instead, a quick and simple statement identifying themselves as police would
suffice to adequately protect suspects, while simultaneously insuring that officers do not lose the
often-necessary element of surprise. In addition, police officers need to identify themselves only
to the extent that a reasonable citizen would understand he is dealing with the police. Officers
would not be required to identify themselves to the satisfaction of idiosyncratic citizen demands.
See Sanchez v City of New York, 2000 WL 987288, *4-5 (SDNY) (concluding that the "plaintiffs
particular beliefs are not the relevant constitutional inquiry" when analyzing whether a police
officer has identified himself).

